En el marco de los 800 años de la celebración del encuentro de San Francisco y el Sultán, convocado por la Orden Franciscana, el presente artículo pretende indagar sobre la concepción de la imagen del moro en la sociedad colonial y, particularmente reflejados en la serie de 54 cuadros de la vida de san Francisco del Museo de Arte Colonial de San Francisco, Santiago de Chile, confeccionada en el siglo XVII en un taller del Cuzco y cuyo destino fue (...) el Convento homónimo para la formación y contemplación de los religiosos, que nos permite descubrir su representación. El moro representa el signo del individuo o del territorio pagano, en acción o contexto de violencia, pero capaz de la conversión. Estos aspectos son comunes a los prejuicios traídos por los colonizadores, marcados por la larga lucha en la península contra ellos y las políticas de expulsión de esta comunidad desde España. El arte colonial, a su vez, fue un ejercicio de diálogo cultural que adaptó la cultura hispánica a la realidad del nuevo mundo, y, por tanto, permitió la lectura del moro trasladada a las dificultades y éxitos de la evangelización y a la violencia ejercida por los conquistadores. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz, werde ich die Frage des Naturalismus in Plessners Philosophie des organischen Lebens und seiner amerikanischen Rezeption, in besonders die philosophischen-biologischen Schriften von Marjorie Grene, untersuchen. Die amerikanische Philosophin Grene war die Hauptvertreterin Plessners im Englischen Sprachraum in 20sten Jahrhundert, die Plessners anthropologischen Argumentation in ihren Schriften zur Philosophie der Biologie aufgenommen und verwendet hat. Grene kritisierte in ihren frühen Schriften Heidegger, Sartre, und die Existenzphilosophie, die das menschliche Dasein von der Natur radikal absondert und die negative Affekte (...) wie Angst hervorhebt, in Vergleich mit Plessners weiterem Blick der Leibhaften, Sinnlichen, Tierischen Entwicklung des menschlichen Lebens. Die menschliche Existenz kann nicht dualistisch, wo „keine Brücke über den Abgrund zwischen Mensch und Tier führt,“ sondern nur biologisch-lebensphilosophisch oder ökologisch verstanden werden. Plessner und Grene setzen sich mit dem Reduktionismus des modernen Naturalismus auseinander und zeigen, wie das Natürliche weiter und ergänzt gedacht werden muss, weil der Naturalismus keine ausreichenden Begriffe für die Auslegung der Erscheinungen und Ausdrucksformen des organischen Lebens besitzt. Die Unterscheidung zwischen der "zentrischen Positionalität" des Tiers und der "exzentrischen Positionalität" des menschlichen Tiers ermöglicht eine holistisch aber differenzierte Beschreibung der Natur und Kultur, insbesondere die natürlichen Künstlichkeit, die der Kultur und das des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Diese sind Grundlage für die geschichtliche und soziale Bildung, Aufbau, und Strukturierung der natürlichen Spontaneität, Produktivität, und Expressivität des Lebens und ermöglichen die dezentrierte, utopische, und persönliche Individuation der einzelnen Menschen im Lebenszusammenhang, was wichtige soziologische und auch ethische und politische Konsequenzen für Plessner und Grene hat: Der Mensch ist ein natürliches biologisches Individuum, das durchaus fähig ist, eine verantwortliche Person zu werden , und zwar durch die umfassende Beteiligung an (oder als ein einzigartiger Ausdruck) einer Kultur. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band der Gesammelten Schriften Leonard Nelsons faßt die neben den großen systematischen Werken zur praktischen Philosophie stehenden Einzelarbeiten zusammen, in denen Nelson ethische und pädagogische Fragen behandelt. Gerade in ihnen tritt der charakteristische Zug Nelsonschen Philosophierens in besonderer Weise hervor: die enge Wechselbeziehung zwischen dem Bemühen um wissenschaftlich strenge Begründung auf der einen Seite und dem um praktisch vordringliche Fragestellungen und Ergebnisse auf der anderen. Auch in konkreten Sonderfragen geht es Nelson stets darum, mit dem gesicherten (...) Rüstzeug der kritischen Methode zu Antworten vorzudringen, die als Beitrag der Philosophie für die Erneuerung des öffentlichen Lebens verstanden werden können. (shrink)

Patients who experience difficulty making medical decisions are often referred to as “ambivalent.” However, the current lack of attention to the nuances between a cluster of phenomena that resemble...

Pierre Trémaux’s 1865 ideas on speciation have been unjustly derided following his acceptance by Marx and rejection by Engels, and almost nobody has read his ideas in a charitable light. Here we offer an interpretation based on translating the term sol as “habitat”, in order to show that Trémaux proposed a theory of allopatric speciation before Wagner and a punctuated equilibrium theory before Gould and Eldredge, and translate the relevant discussion from the French. We believe he may have influenced Darwin’s (...) revision to the third edition of the Origin on rates of evolution, and suggest that Gould’s dismissal of Trémaux is motivated by concern that others might think punctuated equilibrium theory was tainted by a connection with Trémaux. (shrink)

Let me make it clear from the outset that my main point isnoteither of the following: one, that there should be more women economists and research on “women's issues”, or two, that women as a class do, or should do, economics in a manner different from men. My argument is different and has to do with trying to gain an understanding of how a certain way of thinking about gender and a certain way of thinking about economics have become intertwined (...) through metaphor – with detrimental results – and how a richer conception of human understanding and human identity could broaden and improve the field of economics for both female and male practitioners. (shrink)

This is a summation by an outstanding American theological writer of a lifetime of thought about the course that mankind has taken. This book has taken its place in religious writing as a clear statement of the empirical religious philosophy which he has been instrumental in establishing and developing. Originally published in 1958 by the Southern Illinois University Press. Co-published with the Foundation for the Philosophy of Creativity.

Charles Pigden has argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden’s argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic, and does not rely on controversial assumptions about Aristotelian biology or 'institutional facts.'.

Chemistry educator Alex H. Johnstone is perhaps best known for his insight that chemistry is best explained using macroscopic, submicroscopic, and symbolic perspectives. But in his writings, he stressed a broader thesis, namely that teaching should be guided by scientific research on how the brain learns: cognitive science. Since Johnstone’s retirement, science’s understanding of learning has progressed rapidly. A surprising discovery has been when solving chemistry problems of any complexity, reasoning does not work: students must apply very-well-memorized facts and algorithms. (...) Following Johnstone’s advice, we review recent discoveries of cognitive science research. Instructional strategies are recommended that cognitive studies have shown help students learn chemistry. (shrink)

Contemporary medical education must train skilled and compassionate health care professionals who are rigorous in their approach to patient care and their pursuit of knowledge and solutions. Problem-based learning has been widely introduced, but there is no evidence that it leads to better outcomes than more traditional programs, and fundamental gaps in conceptual knowledge may result. Recently, emphasis has been placed on a solid grounding in underlying concepts combined with a systems-based approach, and ability to transfer information and solve problems. (...) Integrating traditional scientific and clinical disciplines with progressive and continuous assessment, may be a better means of achieving the combined aims of clinically relevant curriculum design, vertical integration of medical knowledge, and facilitation of the continuum of training. Being adaptable and flexible, cognisant of costs, and driven by evidence are key features of delivering medical education and contemporary medical practice. Educational research should lead to continuous improvement, but innovation without evaluation and attention to costs may create as many, or more, problems as are solved. (shrink)

The probabilistic analysis of functional questions is maturing into a rigorous and coherent research paradigm that may unify the cognitive sciences, from the study of single neurons in the brain to the study of high level cognitive processes and distributed cognition. Endless debates about undecidable structural issues (modularity vs. interactivity, serial vs. parallel processing, iconic vs. propositional representations, symbolic vs. connectionist models) may be put aside in favor of a rigorous understanding of the problems solved by organisms in their natural (...) environments. [Shepard; Tenenbaum & Griffiths]. (shrink)

Humanism in nursing: the emergence of the lightThis paper examines Western nursing practices by focusing on their spiritual aspect. The transformation of the informal and poorly trained nurse into the trained and uniform persona of the modern nurse is the subject of many nursing histories and part of nursing mythology. Using the work of Michel Foucault and Marcel Mauss, the nursing that preceded the 19th century reformers is re‐examined and continuities between current and quite ancient practices of nursing are explored. (...) The development of practices or technologies for care of the sick originated with the establishment of hospitals in the 4th century as part of pious Christian practice. Current practices of care and the discourse of holistic nursing are argued to have grown from these traditional Christian technologies of care. Humanist or holistic nursing represents the enshrinement of the Christian edios – freed of doctrine; the discourse of caring a redrafted Christian discipline of love. (shrink)

My final aim in this paper is to show that Descartes is not guilty, as is so often maintained, of circular argumentation in the Meditations. But first it is important to uncover and remove certain tenacious misconceptions and confusions concerning what goes on in the Meditations which lend credence to the charge of circular argumentation. In this connection Mr. Harry Frankfurt's recent article, “Memory and the Cartesian Circle,” is peculiarly instructive; for it presents not only a completely untenable defence of (...) Descartes but one that, implicitly at least, rests on the very misconceptions that give substance to the notion of a Cartesian Circle. With the intention, then, of clearing the ground for the construction of my own defence of Descartes, I shall spend the first part of this paper examining Frankfurt's central thesis, the errors contained in it, and their sources. This thesis is contained in his statement, which I shall henceforth designate by the letter “J,” “Descartes did not attempt to justify present clear and distinct perceptions.”. (shrink)

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson's paradox, (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson's paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a "formar" answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson's paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl's causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. (...) We argue that the "how to proceed question?" does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth's account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the "how to proceed question" needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson's paradox "paradoxical.". (shrink)

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? What is the proper analysis of the paradox? How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how (...) to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.”. (shrink)

My brand of evolutionary economics recognizes, highlights, that modern economies are always in the process of changing, never fully at rest, with much of the energy coming from innovation. This perspective obviously draws a lot from Schumpeter. Continuing innovation, and the creative destruction that innovation engenders, is driving the system. There are winners and losers in the process, but generally the changes can be regarded as progress. The processes through which economic activity and performance evolve has a lot in common (...) with evolution in biology. In particular, at any time the economy is marked by considerable variety, there are selection forces winnowing on that variety, but also continuing emergence of new ways of doing things and often economic actors. But there also are important differences from biological evolution. In particular, both innovation and selection are to a considerable degree purposive activities, often undertaken on the basis of relatively strong knowledge. (shrink)

Both of the main points in Professor Murphy's paper seem to me clearly and effectively argued.1 It is incontrovertible that some people find hurtful the use of medical technologies to avoid the birth of children who, in the present order of things, would be disabled. No result from the philosophy of language, or anywhere else for that matter, can plausibly show otherwise. Indeed, even to speak of ‘legitimately interpreting’ events that cause one pain as ‘hurtful’, as Murphy does, seems a (...) shade too conciliatory to any who has the temerity to doubt this matter: typically, at least, I don't interpret a state of affairs as hurtful. I experience it so—or not.He's quite right to point out as well that the fact that someone's actions cause another to feel hurt does not, on its own, imply much of anything about the action's propriety. There are many serious people who are deeply distressed by others' reproductive choices that have nothing to do with disability: terminating a pregnancy for any reason causes some people considerable pain. Yet there seems no reason whatever to regard that pain, considered on its own, as a reason that—at least in general terms—should bear on a person's decision concerning whether or not to give birth to the fetus that she is gestating.Expressivist arguments, so understood, then, seem to have had their measure taken. If anyone had the temerity to think that no one is hurt by choices to avoid or end pregnancies because they might lead to the birth of a child who would be disabled, they can drop that thought right now. On the other hand, if someone thought that the hurt suffered by such people constitutes a serious reason for restricting what others can find out about their potential or actual pregnancies, or …. (shrink)

This is a summation by an outstanding American theological writer of a lifetime of thought about the course that mankind has taken. This book has taken its place in religious writing as a clear statement of the empirical religious philosophy which he has been instrumental in establishing and developing. Originally published in 1958 by the Southern Illinois University Press. Co-published with the Foundation for the Philosophy of Creativity.

This is a summation by an outstanding American theological writer of a lifetime of thought about the course that mankind has taken. This book has taken its place in religious writing as a clear statement of the empirical religious philosophy which he has been instrumental in establishing and developing. Originally published in 1958 by the Southern Illinois University Press. Co-published with the Foundation for the Philosophy of Creativity.